• Belief u pdating in an uncertain environment
One of the strong assets of probability theory for reasoning with uncertain information is the existence of Bayes rule of conditioning that serves as a basis for an efficient theory of belief updating. This feature is apparently missing in alternative theories of uncertainty such as belief functions and possibility theory, despite the existence of conditioning notions that are more and more discussed curre ntly. Especially whether Dempster rule and other symmetric combination rules can serve as a substitute to Bayesian inference is debatable. In this paper we make a step toward addressing these problems by proposing alternative updating rules that extend the notion of conditioning while preserving the intrinsic dissymmetry of the process of updating knowledge bases.
Here knowledge bases are considered from a se mantic point of view. This means that their contents are supposed to be represented by a unique weight distribution on a suitable universe, in a given uncertainty modeling framework. In the following, Shafer (1976) 's basic probability assignments, Zadeh 
• Updating in Shafer's evidence theory
In probability theory, conditioning is defmed by
Bayes' formula P(B I A) = P(A n B) (1) P(A) where P( · ) denotes the prior probability, A is observed (with complete certainty) and P( · I A) denotes the a posteriori probability measure, taking A for granted. A and B are supposed to be subsets of a referential set 0.
Jeffrey (1965)'s rule extends Bayes' conditioning to the case where the observation is pervaded with uncertainty. Let a be the (probabilistic) certainty with which A is observed, and thus 1 -a corresponds to the certainty that A is actually observed. Then the updated probability measure P' is defmed � P'(B) =a· P(B I A)+ (1 -a) · P(B I A) (2) where P(B I A) and P(B I A) are given by (1). This expression is generalized to the case where the possible observations A 1 , ... , A n make a partition, and where a i is the certainty of having observed At.
(with 2; = 1 ,n a i = 1), by
In his boo k Pearl (1988) tries to cast th is rule within the classical Bayesian framework, noticing that a i could be interpreted as a conditional probability P(A i iE) where E denotes the event producing an uncertain observation. Then P'(B) is of the form P(BIE) provided that E and B are conditionally independent given A i , for all i. See Shafer (1981) for a comparison with Dempster's rule of combination. Nevertheless let us recall that the linear convex combination is the unique way of combining probability measures in an eventwise manner (the same combination law applies for each event) which leads to a probability measure as a result (Lehrer & Wagner, 1981 ; Berenstein et al., 1986) . "Thus the expression {3), whatever its other justifications, is not at all surprising.
Lastly note that if n = {ro 1 , ... , roml and Aj = {ro i }, 'V i = l,m, a i = P2({ro i }) for a probability measure P2, then Jeffrey's rule (3) comes down to a simple substitution of the prior probability P by the uncertain observation P2, i.e. P'(B) = P 2 (B), 'VB, since P(B I { ro i }) = 1 if ro i e B, and 0 otherwise. Let us now consider Shafer's evidence theory. In this framework the available knowledge is represented in terms of a basic probability assignment m, which is a set function from the set of subsets 2° of a so called frame of discernment n to [0,1] with the constraints m(0) = 0 and L A m(A) = 1. The subsets A � n such that m(A) > 0 are called focal elements. Note that there is no constraint on the structure of the set ff of focal elements (here supposed finite and which does not make a partition in general). Let us 308 emphasize that the pair (ff ,m) can be viewed as a random set (Goodman & Nguyen, 1985 ; Dubois & Prade, 1986a) . This means that each focal element A i represents the most accurate description of the reality with certainty m(A i ). The subsets A i are the possible realizations of the observation pervaded with uncertainty. Due to the incompleteness of the available information, A i is not necessarily a singleton. A plausibility function PI as well as a belief function Bel can be bijectively associated with m (Shafer, 1976) and are defmed by Pl(B) = LA:AnB� m(A)
Bel(B) = 1 -PlcB) = L0;e A � B m(A)
In terms of plausibility functions, Dempster rule of conditioning is expressed by Pl(B lA) = Pl(A n B) ; Bel(B I A) = 1 -PlcB I A) (6) Pl(A) This rule of conditioning can be justified on the basis of an axiom that defines a conditional function associated to any set-function f defined on n as follows (Cox, 1946) :
which expresses that the degree attached to A n B is a function • of the degree attached to B combined with the degree attached to A, given that B is taken for �ted. It is well known that the Boolean structure of 2 0 forces • to be a product up to an isomorphic transformation, when • is strictly monotonic in both places (e.g. Cox, 1946 ; Aczel, 1966) . Note that (7) justifies Dempster's conditioning rule as well as the geometric rule of conditioning (Suppes & Zanotti, 1977) Bel g (
In terms of basic probability assignments, PI( · I B) defmed by (6) is obtained by transferring all masses m(A) over to A n B, followed by a normalization step, while Bel g ( · I B) is obtained by letting m 8 (A I B) = m(AJ if A� B and 0 otherwise, followed by normalization, i.e. a more drastic way of conditioning (see Dubois & Prade, 1986b ). Dempster's rule of conditioning looks more attractive from the point of view of updating since Pl(A I B) is undefined only if Pl(B) = 0 (i.e. B is impossible) while Bel g (A I B) is undefined as soo n as Bel(B) = 0 (i.e. B is unknown). This unability to update with a vacuous prior is very counterintuitive, with the geometric rule.
Another approach to conditioning has been proposed by De Campos et al. (1989) and Fagin & Halpern (1989) 
(10)
These definitions are justified by interpreting belief and plausibility functions as lower and up per probabilities, since it has been proved that P*(A I B)= sup{P(A I B) I P e �(Bel)} (11)
where £P(Bel) = {P I Bel(A) ::;:; P(A) ::;:; Pl(A), '\1 A}. These conditional functions are actually upper and lower conditional probabilities and have been considered by Dempster himself. Although very satisfying from a probabilistic point of view, these defmitions lead to a rather uninformative conditioning process since P*(
as soo n as
the conditioning set B refines the granularity of the prior evidence by producing smaller focal elements. In that case the updating process corresponds to oblivion rather than learning. Although difficult to justify from the point of view of upper and lower probability, Dempster rule of conditioning is more informative (increasing the precision of focal elements is permitted). Moreover this rule can be viewed as the intersection of the random set underlying Bel, and the conditioning set, i.e. it is completely justified from the standpoint of random sets and corresponds to a conjunctive set theoretic operation. Then normalization is justified if the conditioning set must be taken for granted. Note that from the point of view of belief functions, the upper-lower probability view makes no sense just because belief functions are supposed to reflect a degree of certainty that uses a convention differing from probability functions (Bel{A) = 1 means certainty, Bel(A) = 0 means uncertainty) and that is not viewed as a lower probability (although from a mathematical point of view it is so). This point, i.e. that any set function can be used to represent certainty (up to further foundational issues) without referring to an unreachable probability function has often been overlooked by belief function opponents. Belief functions can be used as a model for evaluating certainty (this view is advocated by Smets (1988) ) or as a model for capturing imprecision in probability (this view is that of Fagin & Halpern (1989) , among others). Adopting the first point of view, Dempster rule of conditioning can be justified from a set of intuitive axioms (e.g. Cox conditioning axioms 309 (Dubois & Prade, 1988b) or, the approach by Smets (1988) ) that never uses the set of probabilities underlying the mathematical model of the belief functions.
Dempster rule of combination can be defined as a normalized intersection of two independent random sets (ff 1 ,m 1 ) and (ff 2• m z )
This rule has been justified by Smets (1988 Smets ( , 1990 from axiomatic arguments. When the random set (ff 2•m2) associated with m2 reduces to the ordinary subset A, i.e. m2(A) = 1 and V A' :F. A, m2(A ') = 0, it can be easily checked that (13) and (4) give (6). Thus (13) extends (6) to the case of an uncertain observation represented by (ff 2.m2), but in a symmetrical manner. This is unfortunate from an updating point of view. Indeed Dempster rule embodies the combination of information from parallel sources that play the same role, while the notion of updating is basically dissymetrical : new information does not play the same role as a priori information. A non-symmetrical extension of (6) in case of uncertain observation, in the spirit of Jeffrey's rule (3), is provided by the formula
where PI 1 (B I A)= . The expression (14) PI1 (A)
. can be interpreted in the following way : the subset A is the accurate description of what is observed with probability m 2 (A) and (14) is nothing but the expected plausibility of B given the uncertain observation. Formula (14) was suggested by Dubois & Prade (1986b; p. 140) up to a normalization factor and further discussed by lchihashi & Tanaka (1989) among different alternatives to Dempster's rule. (13) and (14) coincide when the normalization factor of Dempster rule is 1.
The counterparts of ( 14 J in terms of functions m or Bel can be easily obtained since it can be checked that the convex combination I i= 1 n a i · Pl i with li= l ,n a i = 1 corresponds to the plausibility function generated by the basic probability assignment l:.j = 1 It can be easily checked that (14) or (17) reduce to Jeffrey's rule when (ff l •m l ) defines a probability measure (i.e. fF 1 only contains singletons of Q) and (fF 2,m2) is such that ff 2 is a partition of n. Wagner (1989) has recently established that the only eventwise combination of plausibility (or belief functions) is the linear convex combination, as it is the case for probability measures. This is a fonnal justification for (14) or (17), since as soon as we have in mind the random set view of a basic probability assignment, it is natural to require that the is not bll e for all A) ; it may seem a bit disturbing since it allows that the new information states, as somewhat probable, something which was held as certainly false according to previous infonnation. We now examine the difference in behaviour of Dempster's rule of combination and of the extended Jeffrey's rule on a small example.
Example: Let S: � = (A 1 . B 1} wi� m1(A1) = a and m1(B1 ) = 1
• a , ff2 = { A2 .B2} w t th m 2 (A 2) = � am m2<B2) = 1 -�·Let us assume that A1 "' A2 = 0: A 1 (i B1 :�;0; A 1 n Bz :�;0; B1 n Bz :�;0; Az n B 1 :�; 0 : A2 (i Bz * 0.
Dempster' s rule yields m = m 1 $ mz with m(At n B 2 )= a · ( 1 m(Bt n A2l (fF2.mz)) = �; m(At n Bzl (�z.mz))= a(l -p) ; m(B 1 (i B2 1 (fF 2.m2)) = (1 -a)(l -p).
As it can be seen on this example, and easily proved in the general case from (15)- (16) Possibility measures and necessity measures are respectively particular cases of plausibility functions and belief functions when the focal elements are nested. However the linear convex combination of possibility measures (or of necessity measures) does not yield a possibility measure (or a necessity measure) generally (see Dubois & Prade, 1986a) . Thus the approach presented in the preceding section cannot be applied to possibility and necessity measures for updating them under an uncertain observation (expressed in a possibilistic way), if we further require that the result be a possibility measure. Let us first recall that a possibility measure I1 over .0 can be defined, through a so-called possibility d istributi on 1t, which is a function from .0 to [ 0 ,1], by the formula (Zadeh, 1978) 'r/ A!;;; ; .0, Il(A) = SUPro e A 1t(ro) (I1 1 (A) ), ... , f n (Il n (A))) ( 2 1) where f i is a monotonically increasing function such that f i (O) • 0, 'v'i and 3j, f j ( l) • 1 which modifies the shape of the possibility distribution 7t i underlying II i · An example of admissible possibility consensus function is the weighted maximum operation, i.e. Il(A) = maxj = l,n min(Aj, Ilj(A)) ( 22 ) with max j=1 , n A j = 1, where A j represents the relative importance of the source yielding ll j (Dubois & Prade, 1986c) . However, in ( 22 ), the minimum can be changed into a product, or into the linear operation max(O, a + b -1), and more generally into any operation • with 1 • 1=1, 0 • 1 = 0 = 1 • 0, and increasing in both places� In fact, the weighted max-combination is the counterpart in possibility theory of the linear convex combination in probability theory ; the weighted In other words {(B2 a. , a ) I a e ( 0 ,1]} can be viewed as a basic possibilistic assignment, and a is indeed the possibility that the "possibilistic set" attached to 1t2 , (just as a random set is attached to a basic probability assignment) is precisely equal to B2 a · It is worth noticing that the expressions defining [n 1 I 7t2] or CI1 1 I n2J are integrals in the sense of (Sugeno, 1977) when ro or A is fixed, just as Jeffrey's rule viewed as an expectation, is an integral in the usual sense (in a finite setting). Observe that the rule of conditioning gives the maximal importance to the core of the fuzzy set B2 (the set of elements with membership 1) which, being the smallest level cut, is the more informative, and less and less importance when level cuts become larger ( a. <� � Bza� B zR).
We have now to give the Bayes-like rufe of conditioning in possibility theory, i. Note also that the rule of conditioning in possibility theory is a particular case of the more general symmetric rule of combination (see Dubois & Prade (1988a) , Shafer (l987) for instance)
where * is a conjunctive operation which is symmetrical, non-decreasing, and such that Vae [0,1], a * 1 = a. This rule is the possibilistic counterpart of Dempster rule of combination, while ( 2 4) plays the same role with respect to Jeffrey's updating rule.
Introducing ( 2 7) into ( 2 4) leads to the following updating formula
Observe that when a decreases , 111 (B 2 a) can only 1ti (ro) increase (since B 2 a become larger) and thus=---Il t <Bza> can only decrease. Moreover, �Bz (ro) = I only if a S 1t 2 (ro) and 0 otherwise. Henc� the suprenum in (30) is attained for a = 1t 2(ro ). The updating fonnula can thus be expressed in a more compact way :
where B2
1t2(ro ) = (ro' 1 1t 2 (ro ' ) 2: 1tz(ro)}. The effect of this updating formula is pictured on Figure 2 .
Fi�MJ<2
It is worth noticing that [1t 1 I 1t 2 ] is normalized as soon as the core of 1t 2 overlaps the suppon of 1t2 (i.e. exist ro such that 1t 1 (ro) > 0 and 1tz(ro) > 0).
Another important propeny is that [1t 1 I 1t 2 ] = min(1t 1 ·': 2 ) wh�n .
the . c�res of 1t 1 and 1t 2 are overlappmg. Thts IS similar to the coincidence between the extended Jeffrey's rule and Dempster rule when no normalization factor is necessary in the latter. This is well in accordance with the fact that if the available information is of the fonn x e A, then upon arri val of a sure piece of information x e B, the updating process consists in producing x e A n B. More generally the denominator IT 1 (B z 1t (roY in (31) helps producing a normalized result on �e basis that 1t2 is considered as certain, in the spirit of conditioning.
Let us examine the panicular case where
where B is an ordinary subset of .0. Then it means that B is completely possible (Ilz(B) = 1) and there is a possibility equal to A that the observation is outside B (ll 2 (B) = A). In that case the result of the conditionalization of 1t 1 by the uncertain observation represented by 1tz is given by
Ti t ( B ) This is illustrated by Figure 3 , where we see that in that case the result Figure 3 is the intersection of 1t 1 and 1t 2 , which is renormalized over the subset B only. As expected,
[ll 1 Jll 2 J(B) = A, and the combination is dissymetrical ; it favors the new information (1t 2 ) over the old one. -the A-part of K such that
It is interesting to translate this notion into the possibilistic setting. Definitions (3 2 ) and (33)
respectively become 1t K (ro) .
1t K (ro I A) = --tf ro e A (34) In order to compare Spohn's rule to the possibilistic updating rule, we let a = e -n and note that it comes down to updating a possibility distribution 1t L = 1t K on the basis of an uncertain observation Il(J\) = a (or equivalently N(A) = 1 -a in terms of the degree of certainty). A comparison of the two rules is given in Figure 4 for the three mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases A n C = 0, 
Conclu sion
In this paper, we have demonstrated that there are two kinds of rules for the combination of information : symmetric rules (that combine sources in parallel) and dissymmetric rules that correspond to the idea of updating. Dempster rule and fuzzy set intersections are among the fllSt kind of rules while Jeffrey's rule, is of the other kind, as well as the rules proposed in this paper for belief functions and possibility measures. These two kinds of uncertainty measures lead to different updating formulas only for A. Saffiotti
